Carrying a Good Joke Too Far by Alces, Peter A. & Hopkins, Jason M.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2008
Carrying a Good Joke Too Far
Peter A. Alces
William & Mary Law School, paalce@wm.edu
Jason M. Hopkins
Copyright c 2008 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Alces, Peter A. and Hopkins, Jason M., "Carrying a Good Joke Too Far" (2008). Faculty Publications. Paper 9.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/9
CARRYING A GOOD JOKE TOO FAR 
PETER A. ALCES* AND JASON M. HOPKINs•• 
When it came to the preemptive codification of payments law, com-
mercial law spirits ran high in the early 1950s. Frederick Beutel, then a 
Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska, I had written in support of 
the argument that "[t]he Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should 
Not Be Adopted."2 He complained about the scope of the Code,3 its lan-
guage,4 its un-Code-like character,5 and the impracticality of its rule of 
interpretation and application,6 but he saved his most powerful salvo for all 
of Article 4, which he famously described as "a piece of vicious class legis-
lation."? Well, even making some allowance for scholarly hyperbole, it 
does warm the soul of a student of the commercial law to see any piece of 
commercial legislation generate such, let us say, excitement. 
Beutel was sure that Article 4 was a "sellout" to the bank lobby by the 
sponsors of the Code to win that important constituency's support for the 
balance of the U.C.c.s In fact, he traced the bank lobby's efforts to gain 
legislative blessing of banks' efforts to impose contracts on their customers 
to the failed American Bankers' Association Uniform Bank Collection 
• Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary School of Law. 
•• Associate, Locke Liddell & Sapp LLP. We are indebted to Matthew Forgue and Justin Rucki 
for valuable research assistance. 
I. Beutel's staunch opposition to the U.C.C. engendered a certain amount of fame, or, perhaps, 
infamy. See, e.g., Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in 
Codification, 16 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (1951); Frederick K . Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] 
Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952) [hereinafter Beutel, The Proposed 
Umform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted). He did, however, author a casebook on the 
subject. FREDERICK K. BEUTEL, INTERPRETATION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAWS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1950). His treatise on negotiable instruments, a primary area of interest for Beutel, re-
mains in print today. FREDERICK K. BEUTEL, BEUTEL'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (Greenwood Press 7th ed. 1971) (1902). 
2. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform[?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, supra note I. 
3. /d. at 336-37. 
4. /d. at 337-39. 
5. /d. at 348-50. 
6. /d. at 350--52. 
7. /d. at 357. 
8. /d. at 362. In Beutel's view, passage of the Article "raise[d] the question whether the Ameri-
can Law Institute has ceased to be a learned scientific body to become a plush pressure group domi-
nated by reactionary financial interests." /d. at 363. 
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Code.9 So Article 4 of the U.C.C. was, according to Beutel, just the banks' 
final vindication of the strong-arm tactics they had not been able to push 
through state legislatures on their own. As a part of "uniform" legislation, 
Article 4 could become part of a deal and would not have to stand on its 
own. The bank lobby had something to offer in exchange for its protective 
legislation: promulgation of comprehensive uniform commercial legisla-
tion, all the rest of the U.C.C. 
Grant Gilmore, surely a giant of the commercial codification move-
ment in this country, to and, at the time, a Professor at the Yale Law School, 
responded to Beutel's attack on the proposed U.C.C.1 I He defended the 
Code's terminology,t2 conflict of laws provisions,I3 and even disagreed 
with what Beutel had said about several provisions of Article 4,14 but, at 
the end of the day, his heart was just not in it: "I do not care to urge enact-
ment of the present text of the Article ... which Beutel draws in question, 
leaving that task to someone who can undertake it with a better heart."I5 
Gilmore's problem was not with all of the proposed Article; in fact, it was 
with one provision: section 4-103, providing that "banks may by general or 
special agreement contract out of any of the rules laid down in the balance 
of the Article, provided only that the bank may not disclaim responsibility 
for the exercise of good faith and ordinary care."16 This, Gilmore con-
cluded, was "carrying a good joke too far."t7 Over the course of the last 
more than half century, we have continued to carry the joke, and we argue 
here that it has not improved with age. 
9. The Bank Collections Code, drafted by lawyers for the American Bank Association without 
the input of the ALI, attempted to "protect the banks throughout the process of collection, throwing the 
loss on the customers." /d. at 358. The legislatures in nineteen states adopted the Code, though the 
courts of some of those states eventually declared the Code unconstitutional. !d. 
10. Gilmore was a member of the U.C.C. drafting committee from 1948-51, the time in which 
Article 4 was finalized. 
II. Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply To Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 
364 (1952) [hereinafter Gilmore, A Reply]. Gilmore characterized Beutel's attack as a "story about the 
young girl who was as good as she was beautiful, from whose mouth fell diamonds at every word. Her 
name was Commercial Law. This lovely maiden had an ugly stepsister, Commercial Code, whose 
mother was a wicked witch known professionally as the American Law Institute." /d. at 364. It merits 
mention that Gilmore, too, appreciated the difficulties in codifying the commercial law. See Grant 
Gilmore, On the Difficulties of CodifYing Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341 (1948). 
12. Gilmore, A Reply, supra note I I, at 367. 
13. !d. at 373-74. 
14. /d. at 374 n.22. 
15. /d. at 374. 
16. /d. at 3 75. Both Gilmore and Beutel were discussing what they referred to as the "Summer, 
195 I" version of the Section. See id. at 374 n.23. Gilmore noted that certain alterations were made 
thereafter in an effort to "simplify the language," id., but the substance of the section, if not the precise 
language, remains intact today. The current section, unchanged by the 2002 amendments to Article 4, is 
reproduced in the next textual paragraph. 
17. !d. at 375. 
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Current 4-103(a) provides: 
The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement, 
but the parties to the agreement cannot disclaim a bank's responsibility 
for its lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or limit the 
measure of damages for the lack or failure. However, the parties may de-
termine by agreement the standards by which the bank's responsibility is 
to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.t8 
881 
It is now a very old joke, and not even such a good joke any longer. 
The next iteration of the bank deposits and collections law ought to stop 
telling it. 
This paper examines the effects of form terms in bank customer 
agreements and the role contract doctrine has (or should have) in policing 
those terms. Part I surveys some of the terms that are most disadvantageous 
to bank customers, as well as the courts' reaction to these terms. Part II 
attempts to shed some light on the reason such terms exist: an informa-
tional cross-subsidy that disadvantages some customers for the benefit of 
banks and their most sophisticated customers. Scholars' attempts to miti-
gate or explain away the effects of this cross-subsidy are explored in Part 
III, and Part IV offers a modest proposal to address the subsidization in the 
specific context of bank-customer agreements. Part V concludes. 
I. THE POTENTIALLY OFFENSIVE TERMS 
Start from the premise that some form terms are more problematic 
from the perspective of bank customers because those terms impose bur-
dens on customers that they would not anticipate.t9 This is akin to the "un-
18. U.C.C. § 4-103(a) (2005). An example of the invocation of 4-103 is found in Fundacion 
Museo de Arte Contemporaneo v. CBI-TDB Union Bancaire Privee, 996 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
There, the court refused to find the bank liable for $825,000 fraudulently debited from the customer's 
account because the customer had not reported the fraud to the bank within thirty days of the mailing 
(not receipt) of the account statement as required by the account agreement. !d. at 291. The court ac-
knowledged that the bank customer, located in Venezuela, had exercised "reasonable care and prompt-
ness" as required by 4-406, especially given the unreliability of the Venezuelan mails. /d. at 290-91. 
Similarly, in Lema v. Bank of America, N.A., 826 A.2d 504, 508 (Md. 2003), the court, citing a boiler-
plate provision in the deposit agreement, permitted the bank to charge back $60,000 to Lema's account 
even though the deposit had become "final" under 4-214(a). 
19. This premise is the subject of ongoing hearings in the U.S. Senate. Senator Dodd, chairman of 
the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, doubts the ability of bank customers to 
understand their transactions with the bank: 
We must closely examine the current disclosure regime. The current system of disclosure is 
outdated, has not kept pace with the variety of credit card practices, and consumers have little 
understanding of the terms and conditions of their credit card contracts. Despite the signifi-
cant work of many ... to provide consumers with clear, understandable, and consistent in-
formation, consumers are increasingly becoming confused and intimidated. 
Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card Industry, and Their 
Impact on Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking. Housing. and Urban Affairs, I lOth 
Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
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fair surprise" element of unconscionability,20 without concluding, of 
course, that the terms are in fact unconscionable. We cannot take "unfair 
surprise" too seriously without concluding that virtually all legal terms are 
in some respect surprising, often unfairly so, if our test of surprise is the 
customer's expectations.2l How many bank customers really appreciate 
what is at stake if a choice of law or arbitration clause is enforceable? In-
deed, how many lawyers could certainly tell them? How many bank cus-
tomers have any idea that there is any limit on banks' ability to propose and 
enforce potentially oppressive terms unilaterally? 
So instead of unfair surprise in the unconscionability sense, we must 
settle on a different conception of what should and should not be enforce-
able. The problem is that we may not be able to do much better than the 
idea of agreement: why would we ever want the law to enforce a term that 
is not the product of agreement? But if we take agreement seriously in the 
bank-customer context, we might have to acknowledge that there is in fact 
no agreement, in any meaningful sense, between the contracting parties. 
Banks dictate and customers acquiesce. Most of the time that causes no 
problem, because nothing goes wrong, and if anything goes very wrong the 
customer will respond by changing banks. Certainly it is unlikely that the 
customer will pay any more attention to the form of agreement imposed 
upon her by the second bank than she did to the form proffered by the first 
Affairs). Senator Dodd pointed to double cycle billing, penalty increases in interest rates, and the issu-
ance of multiple low limit cards with exorbitant fees as but a few of the "controversial" and "pervasive" 
practices responsible for consumers' confusion and intimidation. /d. 
20. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt.l ("The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair sur-
prise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."); see also 
Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Mass. 1992) ("Unconscionability must be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, with particular attention to whether the challenged provision could result in oppres-
sion and unfair surprise to the disadvantaged party .... "); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 
534 N.E.2d 824, 830 (N.Y. 1988) ("The aim of the Uniform Commercial Code unconscionability 
provision . . . is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise . . . . "). 
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) & cmt. f (1981) (prohibiting the en-
forcement of "terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation"). Commentators disagree 
on the proper application of this section. Professor Hillman argues that "so long as the consumer has 
had a reasonable opportunity to read the standard terms, courts should find tacit or 'blanket' assent to 
conscionable standard terms." Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 743, 748 
(2002). Professor Rakoff concludes that "form terms present in contracts of adhesion ought to be con-
sidered presumptively (although not absolutely) unenforceable." Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhe-
sion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1176 ( 1983). 
For cases applying the reasonable expectation formulation of unconscionability, see Vicksburg 
Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507,523 (Miss. 2005) ("the doctrine of substantive unconscion-
ability invalidates oppressive terms ... such as terms which violate the reasonable expectations of 
parties"); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000) (quoting 
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1981)) ("a contract or provision which does not 
fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party will not be enforced against 
him"); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs., 840 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992) (quoting Graham, 623 P.2d at 
172) (same). 
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bank. But, after all, there is the "principle of the thing," and hope springs 
eternal that the new bank will be "nicer." So to the extent customers vote 
with their feet, there is a (very artificial) way to find something redolent of 
agreement, just not agreement itself. The object of our exercise should be 
to draw the distinction that 4-103 obscures-to decide when it is appropri-
ate to enforce the terms of the bank-customer agreement against the party 
who did not draft, that is, against the customer-and we need to get rid of 
4-103 in order to do so. 
Before suggesting the contours of a calculus that could supplant cur-
rent 4-103, it is necessary to consider briefly the range of terms such a cal-
culus would police. Among the most often litigated terms contained in run-
of-the-mill bank-customer agreements are provisions concerning a cus-
tomer's right to a jury trial in the event of litigation related to the account22 
and the ability of the bank to change the terms of the account agreement. 23 
Clearly, these are not the only potentially pernicious provisions contained 
in bank agreements, but they are some of the most challenged terms. While 
it may be the case that some consumer would have some idea of how these 
terms would operate, it is quite unlikely that the terms--or the agreements 
themselves-would ever be read or, if read, understood by the vast major-
ity of bank customers. For the most part, though, that would not distinguish 
bank-customer agreements from any other form agreement between parties 
of unequal sophistication and bargaining power: no one really understands 
the agreement to be the product of "agreement," in any meaningful sense.24 
22. See, e.g., SUMMIT COMMUNITY BANK, CONSUMER DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AGREEMENT AND 
DISCLOSURES I (2006) ("You waive your right to a jury trial in any dispute with us."); BB&T, BANK 
SERVICES AGREEMENT 12 (2006), available at http://www.bbt.com/bbt/about/privacyandsecurity/ 
completeclientprotection/BSA.pdf ("You are waiving rights you may have to litigate . .. before a 
jury."); SUNTRUST BANK, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS 9 (2006), available at 
https://www.suntrust.com/portal/server.pt (select "Business Banking," then "Banking," then "Rules and 
Regulations for Deposit Accounts" hyperlink) ("Depositor and Bank hereby ... waive the right to a 
trial by jury in respect to any litigation based hereon or arising out of these rules and regulations."). 
23. See, e.g., JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, ACCOUNT RULES AND REGULATIONS (ILLINOIS MAJOR 
MARKET) 32 (2006) ("We may change the terms of this Agreement ... upon notice sent to you via 
ordinary U.S. mail .... By maintaining your Account after the effective date of any change, you agree 
to be bound by the changes."); BANK OF AMERICA, DEPOSIT AGREEMENT AND DISCLOSURE I, II 
(2006) ("We may change this Agreement at any time . . . . We generally send you advance notice of an 
adverse change .... If a change is not adverse to you, however, we may make the change at any time 
without advance notice," and "we may post a notice of a change in our banking offices or on our web-
site."). 
24. See generally Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality. Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary, 
Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1223 (2006); 
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples 
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983). 
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Courts asked to enforce the terms of bank-customer agreements do not 
quibble about the reality of agreement. They focus instead on surrogates for 
agreement-essentially, conceptions of fairness. Consider, for example, 
waivers of the right to a jury trial, one of the most pervasive form terrns.25 
Courts acknowledge that such a waiver is rarely the subject of real agree-
ment in the sense of a bargained-for exchange. Instead, drawing on lan-
guage used in the criminal law to determine the validity of a defendant's 
waiver of his constitutional right to counsel,26 courts ask simply whether a 
pre-litigation contractual jury trial waiver was entered into "knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently."27 In determining whether a waiver was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, courts employ multi-factor analyses 
reminiscent of those used to determine the validity of boilerplate generally. 
Oft-used factors include the conspicuousness of the waiver terrn28 and the 
25. See, e.g., Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Crane, 36 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(enforcing a waiver contained in a promissory note); Nat'! Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v. Ross, 130 B.R. 
656, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[T]he Court cannot find a single reported New York decision in which a 
court refused to enforce a jury trial waiver provision in a bank loan agreement or guarantee . ... "); 
Uribe v. Merchants Bank, 642 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (enforcing a waiver contained in 
a safety deposit box agreement); Brian Wallach Agency, Inc. v. Bank of N.Y., 428 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (upholding waiver contained in a deposit agreement). 
26. See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004) ("any waiver of the right to counsel [must) be 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent"); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,452 n.37 (1986) (quoting Solem 
v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 641 , 647-48 (1984)) (same); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 n.l6 (1981) 
("Waivers of the assistance of counsel ... must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a know-
ing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . . . ") (quotation 
omitted). The Court has noted that the ability to waive due process rights to notice and hearing prior to 
a civil judgment "parallels the recognition of waiver in the criminal context where personal liberty, 
rather than a property right, is involved." D. H. Overmyer Co. Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 
(1972). 
27. See, e.g., Phoenix Leasing Inc. v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Nev. 
1994) ("The federal standard for determining the validity of a contractual waiver of the right to jury trial 
requires us to determine if the waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent."); Standard Wire & 
Cable Co. v. AmeriTrust Corp., 697 F. Supp. 368, 375 (C. D. Cal. 1988) ("For a jury trial waiver to be 
effective, it must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent."); L & R Realty v. Connecticut Nat'! Bank, 699 
A.2d 291, 297 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) ("the contractual jury trial waiver must be made knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently"). 
28. See, e.g., Nat'! Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that 
a waiver clause "set deeply and inconspicuously in the contract" did not constitute a knowing and 
intelligent waiver); Gaylord Dep't Stores v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586, 588 (Ala. 1981) (because the 
'jury waiver provision is buried in paragraph thirty-four in a contract containing forty-six para-
graphs ... it does not appear that the waiver by Stephens was intelligently or knowingly made"). Cf 
Phoenix Leasing, 843 F. Supp. at 1384 (upholding a waiver printed in capital letters which was "the 
only material contractual clause appearing on the signature page and [was) located directly above the 
signature line"). 
New York law mandates that consumer transaction contracts and residential leases be printed 
in no less than eight-point typeset. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4544 (McKinney 2007). Courts have had little 
difficulty voiding jury waivers that do not comport with this requirement. See, e.g., Monarch Prop. 
Assoc. v. Benjamin, 454 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Koslowski v. Palmieri, 414 N.Y.S.2d 599 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Street v. Davis, 542 N.Y.S.2d 968 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1989); Balram v. Etheridge, 449 
N.Y.S.2d 389 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982). 
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disparity in bargaining power or knowledge between the parties.29 The 
process of adapting these deal-policing analyses to evaluate the knowledge, 
voluntariness, or intelligence supporting a waiver is somewhat circuitous: a 
waiver is analytically no differeat from any other contract term;30 indeed, 
all contract terms "waive" something insofar as they allocate risk. And the 
analysis is not uniform across all waiver terms: courts analyze waivers of 
the right to proceed as a class not under criminal law notions of waiver, but 
under the contract doctrine of unconscionability.31 Some courts acknowl-
edge that determining whether a waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intel-
ligent is just a roundabout way of determining whether a party agreed to the 
waiver.32 As one court put it, "[i]nherent in the concept of waiver is the 
notion of assent."33 More accurately, waiver requires assent. 
29. See, e.g., Gaylord Dep 't Stores, 404 So. 2d at 588 (refusing to enforce a waiver where "the 
equality of the bargaining power of the parties is questionable"); Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-
Graphics, Inc., 607 A.2d 703, 706 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) ("[A] non-negotiated jury waiver 
clause [that] appears inconspicuously in a standardized form contract entered into without assistance of 
counsel ... should not be enforced."). Cf Cook v. Hibernia Nat'! Bank, 847 So. 2d 617,617 (La. Ct. 
App. 2002) (enforcing a waiver because "Plaintiff is an experienced business woman in these docu-
ments"). 
30. Perhaps there is something "special" about a jury trial waiver. When courts refuse to enforce 
them, opinions are cast in consumer protection language, though given the proliferation of these waiv-
ers, courts may be engaged in a species of self-protection. The supreme courts of Georgia and Califor-
nia, for example, have declared that all contractual jury trial waivers entered into before litigation is 
contemplated are invalid. Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 481 (Cal. 2005) 
(concluding that a statutory list of permissible methods of waiver-which does not include pre-
litigation contractual waiver-is exhaustive); Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1994) 
(finding that because the apposite code sections permit jury waivers only when litigation is contem-
plated, blanket waivers are invalid). 
31. Cases finding these waivers unconscionable include Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 
P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005) (finding a class waiver in a credit card agreement to be unconscionable 
because "class actions and arbitrations are, particularly in the consumer context, often inextricably 
linked to the vindication of substantive rights"); State ex ref. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 278 
(W.Va. 2002) (finding a class waiver to be unconscionable because "the availability of class action 
relief is a sine qua non to permit the adequate vindication of consumer rights"); Discover Bank v. Shea, 
827 A.2d 358, 368 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) ("The requirement for a cardmember to pursue a 
claim against Discover on an 'individual' basis ... is an unconscionable restriction that should not be 
enforced."). Cases reaching the opposite result include Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 
886, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) ("we do not find the no-class-action provision to be so one-sided or op-
pressive as to render the agreement unconscionable"); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 
1261 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001) ("The surrender of that class action right was clearly articulated in the 
arbitration amendment. The Court finds nothing unconscionable about it and finds the bar on class 
actions enforceable."). 
32. See, e.g., Novella v. Hartford Accident & lndem. Co., 316 A.2d 394, 400 (Conn. 1972) 
("Waiver involves the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding.") (quotation omitted); 
Soares v. Max Serv., Inc., 679 A.2d 37, 52 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (same). Cf Allyn v. Western United 
Life Assurance Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (upholding a waiver after finding a 
"pattern of assent to the waiver provisions in other loan transactions"); In re Ball, 665 N.Y.S.2d 444, 
447 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (upholding a waiver because the plaintiff had made a "conscious and delib-
erate decision to consent to arbitration"). 
33. L & R Realty v. Connecticut Nat'! Bank, 699 A.2d 291, 294 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (quoting 
Fisette v. DiPietro, 611 A.2d 417 (1992)). 
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The standard term that is perhaps most likely to upset the reasonable 
expectations of bank customers is the ubiquitous provision allowing banks 
to unilaterally modify the terms and conditions of account agreements. 
These terms are the primary means for the adjustment of rates and fees on 
bank deposit and credit card accounts, a practice with which customers 
rarely quibble.34 Customers object more often, though, when the modifica-
tion imposed by the bank is the addition of an arbitration agreement. Arbi-
tration clauses not only drive the law of contract underground,35 they may 
result in collusion among banks attempting to capture those customers that 
care enough to shop for banks that do not require arbitration_36 Arbitration 
clauses may be pernicious in a negotiated contract setting, but they cause 
even more concern when unilaterally imposed upon customers via a modi-
fication clause contained in a form contract. 
The cases determining the validity of inserted arbitration clauses can 
be reduced to two groups: those in which an apposite statute supports the 
result, and those in which traditional principles of contract law govern. The 
discussion that follows will focus largely on decisions involving bank 
credit agreements, rather than deposit agreements, because credit agree-
ments are more often litigated. The analogy is apt: banks rely on non-
uniform state statutes for authority to modify the terms of credit agreements 
in the same manner they rely on 4-103 when modifying the U.C.C.'s effect 
on deposit agreements. 
Banks that incorporate Delaware law into their credit agreements 
thereby have statutory authority to add arbitration clauses to those agree-
ments, even if the agreement itself contains no modification clause. 
Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise pro-
vides, a bank may at any time and from time to time amend such agree-
ment in any respect .... [including] the addition of new terms ... or 
34. Though customers may complain if the bank overreaches. See Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) 
Nat' I Ass'n, 280 F.3d 384, 395-400 (3d Cir. 2002) (reversing dismissal of a suit alleging a "bait-and-
switch" scheme in which Fleet Bank lured customers in with a no-fee credit card and thereafter imposed 
a fee via the modification clause). 
35. Charles Knapp argues that the non-precedential nature of arbitration results in decisions that 
"neither follow the law, nor contribute to it." Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet 
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 785 (2002). At common law, arbitration 
agreements were unenforceable because they deprived courts of rightful jurisdiction. See John R. 
Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in International Trade: A Study in the Subordination of 
National Interests to the Demands of a World Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 361, 369 (1986) 
(citing LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 432-34 (3d ed. 1972)). 
36. This antitrust claim was made by the plaintiff class in In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust 
Litigation, No. 05 Civ. 7116(WHP), 2006 WL 2685082 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006). The court dismissed 
the claim because the plaintiffs had not satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement of Article Ill standing: 
The banks had not invoked the arbitration agreements in this particular suit. /d. 
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modification of existing terms, whether relating to ... arbitration or 
other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms .... 37 
887 
Courts applying this law are left with little choice but to enforce the 
arbitration "agreement."38 And while the law governs only credit accounts, 
banks can effect the same result by including similar language in the boi-
lerplate of their initial deposit accounts.39 In the absence of an apposite 
statute or pre-modification agreement, however, courts view the addition of 
an arbitration clause through the same prism as any other contractual modi-
fication: mutual consent is required.40 A North Carolina appellate court, 
after distinguishing the cases that relied upon the Delaware statute, found 
that customers "are not bound to unknown [arbitration] terms which are 
beyond the range of reasonable expectation."41 In California, the enforce-
ability of unilaterally imposed arbitration clauses is determined by refer-
ence to classical conceptions of contract agreement: 
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2006) (emphasis added). That section applies specifically to 
bank issuers; other lenders are governed by identical language in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2224 (2006). 
Colorado has a similar statute, though it does not by its express terms extend to the addition of arbitra-
tion clauses. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 5-3-103 (West 2006). 
38. See, e.g., Kurz v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 319 F. Supp. 2d 457, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) ("continued charges by authorized users, coupled with plaintiffs failure to submit to defendant 
the required written objection, evinces plaintiffs consent to the arbitration amendment"); Marsh v. First 
USA Bank, N.A., 103 F. Supp. 2d 909,915 (N.D. Tex. 2000) ("Plaintiff was statutorily and contractu-
ally bound by a valid amendment by virtue of the use of the credit card."); Joseph v. M.B.N.A. Am. 
Bank, N.A., 775 N.E.2d 550, 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) ("M.B.N.A. included an opt-out clause for 
Joseph, but he did not use it. Consequently, he must be held to the amendment of the credit card agree-
ment."). 
At least one court has refused to apply the Delaware law on the ground that a "bill stuffer" 
does not constitute mutual agreement. Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358, 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 2001) ("the Delaware law [Title 5, § 952] clearly violates New Jersey Public policy and under 
New Jersey law that choice of law provision cannot be given effect."). 
39. In Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Miss. 2000), the 
court found that when the customers "signed their initial signature cards, they agreed that the terms and 
conditions of their deposit accounts could change in the future upon sufficient notice." !d. at 1030. 
Because the plaintiffs maintained their accounts under the revised deposit agreements, the court found 
that "the plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate their disputes." !d. at 1032. The court cited Hill v. Gateway 2000 
Inc., 105 F.3d I 147 (7th Cir. 1997), in support of its conclusion that a bank customer need not read an 
arbitration clause to be bound by it. /d. at I 031. 
40. Banks may argue that a failure to immediately pay an outstanding balance constitutes assent to 
the arbitration provision. The court in Shea v. Household Bank (SB) National Ass 'n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
387, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), after noting that consent to modification may be inferred from conduct, 
concluded: "The question then becomes whether plaintiffs failure to immediately pay off the balance 
and cancel the card amounted to a ratification. Our answer is no." 
41. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424, 431 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 211 cmt. F (1981)). The court continued: 
Nor do we believe that allowing Sears to change or amend its agreement without any limita-
tion is within the reasonable expectations of its cardholders. A customer would not expect that 
a major corporation could choose to disregard potential contractual opportunities and then 
later, if it changed its mind, impose them on the customer unilaterally. 
!d. at 432. · 
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The initial step in determining whether there is an enforceable ADR 
agreement between a bank and its customers involves applying ordinary 
state law principles that govern the formation and interpretation of con-
tracts in order to ascertain whether the parties have agreed to some al-
ternative form of dispute resolution.42 
One Pennsylvania federal court not bound by Delaware law43 reached 
the (perhaps overzealous) conclusion that under that statute, "credit card 
holders would find themselves in an Orwellian nightmare, trapped in 
agreements that can be amended unilaterally in ways they never envi-
sioned. "44 Other cases discussed in the footnotes demonstrate that courts, 
when not constrained by statute, apply traditional contract principles and 
attempt to find real, bargained-for agreement supporting the addition of 
arbitration clauses to bank credit agreements.45 
The foregoing survey demonstrates the methods used by courts to 
evaluate boilerplate terms in bank-customer agreements. Surrogates for 
agreement such as principles of waiver and statutes that mandate agreement 
miss the point. Only when agreement-actual knowing understanding-
determines the validity of the term is the fundamental purpose of the con-
tract law vindicated. Having examined the offensive terms themselves, a 
brief explanation of the economics that explains the ubiquity of these terms 
is apposite. 
42. Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998} (emphasis added). 
The court found nothing to "support the proposition that ADR can be imposed on a bank's customers 
without their consent." /d. at 279. 
43. "Courts applying a state law that explicitly authorizes this practice have upheld it, while courts 
that are not similarly bound have often struck down attempts to add wholly new provisions to card-
holder agreements." Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A.04-507, 2004 WL 1508518, at *3 (E. D. 
Pa. July 6, 2004). 
44. /d. at *4. The court here dropped a footnote: "The Court is reminded of George Orwell's 1946 
work, Animal Farm, in which the pigs assume power and change the terms of the animals' social con-
tract, reducing the original Seven Commandments, which included 'All animals are equal, ' to one-
' All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others."' /d. at *4 n.5. 
45. The court in Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), 
started from the proposition that "[a]scertainment of the intent of the contracting parties is the cardinal 
rule in the.construction of agreements." /d. at 197 (quotation omitted}. The court's analysis employs 
classical contract doctrine. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff made no express, affirmative assent to the addition of the arbitra-
tion clause. There is also little evidence to suggest that plaintiff implicitly consented, much 
less the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" required under Virginia 
law .... Therefore, the arbitration clause does not constitute a binding modification under 
general principles of Virginia contract law. 
/d. at 192; see also Long v. Fidelity Water Sys., Inc., No. C-97-20118 RMW, 2000 WL 989914, at *3-4 
(N.D. Cal. May 26, 2000} (finding that the modification clause "is reasonably construed as allowing 
Household [Bank] to .. . change financial terms of the account. It cannot be reasonably construed as 
explicitly allowing the insertion of an arbitration clause .... Accordingly, the court finds that Mr. 
Continolo did not consent to arbitrate this dispute."}; Victoria v. Superior Court, 710 P.2d 833, 834 
(Cal. 1985} ("[T]he policy favoring arbitration cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement 
to arbitrate."} (quotations omitted). 
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II. GUERILLA TERMS AND SHROUDING 
Elsewhere one of us has introduced the "guerilla term," a term whose 
presence or effect is inadequately advertised so that the result is, for rea-
sons discussed below, an exploitation ofunsophisticated consumers.46 That 
exploitation redounds to the benefit of sophisticated consumers and also to 
the benefit of form drafters who incorporate guerilla terms. While bank-
customer agreements may include guerilla terms, not all boilerplate in those 
agreements acquires guerilla status. Account agreements about which there 
is competition and advertisement are examples of form terms that would 
not (for the most part) be guerilla terms.47 However, when the bank hides a 
term in the math for the purposes of exploiting less-sophisticated consum-
ers, that term may be a guerilla term.48 
A recent contribution to the economic literature described the modus 
operandi of such merely ostensible "agreements." Professors Xavier 
Gabaix and David Laibson discovered in shrouded product attributes a 
market in misinformation.49 They conclude that not only do market incen-
tives fail to deter firms from engaging in unscrupulous behavior, but that 
those same incentives instead encourage firms to engage in unconscientious 
advantage-taking: "We show that informational shrouding flourishes even 
in highly competitive markets, even in markets with costless advertising, 
and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies."50 Their 
analysis centers on the pricing of base goods ("loss leaders") and necessary 
accessories ("add-ons"); but because price and risk are directly corre-
lated,SI their conclusions apply equally to bank-customer agreements.s2 
Banks that engage in "shrouding"53 effectively hide the true cost of con-
46. Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511 (2007). The discussion in this Part 
largely retraces that argument. 
47. Such as a free-with-direct-deposit checking account term. 
48. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. 
49. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. OF ECON. 505 (2006). 
50. !d. at 505 (emphasis added). 
51. That is, the more risk you assume, the lower the price you pay; conversely, the less risk you 
assume, the higher the price you pay. 
52. In modem contractual contexts, it is impossible to ignore the interrelatedness of contract and 
product. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 24, at 1229 (arguing that add-ons and hidden contract terms are, 
"for economic purposes ... both just features of the product."); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 
1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Terms of use are no less part of 'the product' than are [the product's 
physical attributes]."). Gabaix and Laibson implicitly acknowledge the contract-product connection in 
their discussion of credit cards, where the terms and conditions are the product. See Gabaix & Laibson, 
supra note 49, at 509. 
53. Succinctly, "a shrouded attribute is a product attribute that is hidden by a firm, even though 
the attribute could be nearly costlessly revealed." Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 49, at 512 (footnote 
omitted). 
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tracting. So customers making the initial purchase decision, i.e., opening 
the checking account, may not consider shrouded attributes such as mainte-
nance costs and hidden fees for account-related services. 54 
Banks, and firms generally, are able to exploit the naivete of their cus-
tomers because incentives to alert myopic customers to the operation and 
impact of the terms contained in bank-customer agreements do not exist in 
equilibrium, that is, even in a competitive market. Gabaix and Laibson 
explain two kinds of exploitation: "Finns exploit myopic consumers. In 
tum, when consumers become sophisticated, they take advantage of these 
exploitative firms."55 Obviously, banks have no incentive to drive out of 
the market those myopic customers who unknowingly pay hidden fees and 
account charges. But perhaps more importantly, banks have no incentive to 
alert those same myopic customers to the existence of the subsidy that re-
dounds to the benefit of the banks' sophisticated customers, who might not 
pay account fees at all. Sophisticated customers, then, may take advantage 
of their banks' exploitation of myopic customers. The sophisticated are 
complicit in the exploitation of the myopic because the welfare loss that is 
born by the myopic redounds to the benefit of the sophisticated. But the 
shrouding effect is not just a case of the law helping those who help them-
selves, i.e., of allowing the sophisticated to take advantage of the expertise 
that they have developed over time and, presumably, at some cost. Indeed, 
the subsidy benefits the sophisticated only because the myopic are essen-
tially duped into subsidizing them by banks that set the price of the base 
good56 (the checking account) below its true cost, while the price of the 
shrouded add-on57 (hidden fees) is set well above its true cost. 
Applied to bank checking accounts, the standard account service (col-
lections and payments) is the base good and "hidden" fees are the add-on. 
At Bank of America, for example,58 a myopic customer might enroll in an 
ostensibly free59 "Regular" checking account and then pay that account's 
$7 monthly "maintenance fe~." A sophisticated customer will understand 
54. Id. at 507-08. 
55. /d. at 509. 
56. Gabaix and Laibson offer printers, hotels, car rentals, and financial services as examples. /d. at 
518 n.33. 
57. Such as a printer cartridge, hotel phone call, or gas charge. !d. 
58. The examples that follow are taken from Bank of America's checking account webpage, Bank 
of America, Checking Account Overview, http://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/checksave/in 
dex.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
59. On Bank of America's checking account page, id., every one of their five checking account 
types is advertised as either "free" or having "no monthly maintenance fee." These words appear in 
bold type; the qualifications-e.g., direct deposit, balance transfer, age 55 or older-appear either in 
fine print or not at all. 
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that the account is "free" only if she maintains a minimum daily balance of 
$750 (or $2,500 in a "linked" savings account). Or she might realize that 
with an automatic deposit she can avoid the fee entirely by enrolling in a 
"MyAccess" checking account. A more sophisticated customer might opt 
instead for the "Advantage" checking account, which pays 0.05% APY on 
deposits, but carries a $20 monthly fee unless the customer maintains one 
of four different (and higher) minimum balances.60 Neither the bank nor its 
sophisticated customers have any incentive to alert the myope to these 
methods of maintenance fee avoidance. Indeed, as Gabaix and Laibson 
show, the incentive is not to educate: the sophisticated customer enjoys the 
benefit of a no-cost checking account at the expense of myopic customers, 
who (perhaps quite rationally61) failed to understand the restrictions placed 
on the "free" account.62 The bank realizes an increase in accounts resulting 
from the failure of its myopic customers to understand the terms and condi-
tions of their accounts.63 
At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider what might be termed the 
apologies for standard form contracts and determine whether the defenses 
work very well in the bank-customer agreement setting. The presentations 
that follow are necessarily succinct, but sufficient to reveal the ultimate 
60. As if that were not enough obfuscation, the "Advantage" minimum account balance is calcu-
lated as the average over the month (average daily balance), while the "Regular" account looks to the 
lowest of a month's daily balances (minimum daily balance). So an Advantage account with a zero 
balance for half the month and twice the required minimum for the other half will incur no fee; a Regu-
lar accountholder in the same circumstances will owe $7. 
61. It is irrational for bank customers to read boilerplate for a variety of reasons: the language is 
difficult for them to understand, they are unlikely to be affected by any specific tenn, the bank's repre-
sentative is not authorized to change the tenns, and they believe that courts will not enforce overly 
harsh tenns. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec-
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 446-47 (2002). Hillman and Rachlinski conclude that "[f]or any 
single consumer, the costs of monitoring a business's standard-form contract outweigh the benefits." /d. 
at 447; see also Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 631 
(2002) (quoting Rakoff, supra note 21, at 1226) ("[T]he rational course is to focus on the few tenns that 
are generally well publicized and of immediate concern, and to ignore the rest."). 
62. Shrouded fees also arise frequently in the online banking context, where the myopic may be 
less able to detect and understand them. Examples include the NSF charges debited to an account 
enrolled in an automatic bill payment service when the account has insufficient funds available to pay 
the bill, the requirement that a user download (and pay for) the software necessary to carry out the 
online bill payment, and the "excess transaction fees" that can result when a bank customer's online bill 
payments exceed the number of transactions allowed by the tenns of her account. See Bank of America, 
Online Banking Service Agreement, http://www.bankofamerica.com/onlinebanking/index.cfm?tem 
plate=service_agreement#4b (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
63. Banks and other finns have become adept at preventing customer education, and thereby 
maintaining the size of the pool of myopic customers. See Alces, supra note 46, at 1527 ("Fonn drafters 
can use a kind of 'three card Monty' game to assure maintenance of the pool of na'ive: Each time con-
sumers discover a particularly egregious tenn, hide the risk-shifting card by reshuffling the deck or by 
slight of hand."). 
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inadequacy of each theory so far as boilerplate in bank-customer agree-
ments is concerned. 
III. THE APOLOGIES 
Scholarly commentary has recognized the challenge forms present 
contract law, and has responded by focusing on the extent to which the 
market can police forms64 and then proposing methods to address the ap-
parently aberrational case of market failure. But the analyses that preceded 
Gabaix and Laibson's identification of shrouding reached efficiency con-
clusions insupportable now that the shrouding mechanism is manifest. 
Nevertheless, review of one of those perspectives serves as a backdrop for 
an evaluation of the post-Gabaix and Laibson apologies. 
A. Unconscionability 
Professor Russell Korobkin has argued that the unconscionability doc-
trine is capable of policing form drafter overreaching.65 Specifically, an 
"inefficient" form term ought to be deemed unenforceable because it is 
unconscionable, while "efficient" form terms ought to be enforced. Uncon-
scionability and inefficiency, then, are equivalent.66 Korobkin starts from 
the unassailable premise that transactors (bank customers) rely on imper-
fect heuristics and therefore make imperfect choices. 67 Indeed, reliance on 
heuristics is entirely rational when the cost of making an entirely informed 
choice is prohibitive.68 Form drafters, understanding that (and also quite 
rationally), exploit their customers' reliance on heuristics by imposing low-
64. Advertising has long been the policing mechanism of choice. Gabaix and Laibson, however, 
demonstrate convincingly the sellers' incentive not to advertise: Sophisticated buyers do not want them 
to do so. Advertising, of course, would reduce the number of myopes, and therefore, the benefit realized 
by the sophisticated on account of the cross-subsidy. Gabaix and Laibson refer to this phenomenon as 
"the curse of debiasing," the tendency of educated consumers to pool with myopes in order to maximize 
the cross-subsidy. Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 49, at 519. 
It is probably impossible to ignore the inability of advertising to police form terms. Consider, 
for example, the absurdity of an advertising strategy in which Princess Cruise Lines pointed out that 
although their fares were identical to Carnival's, Princess customers in fact got a better deal because in 
the event of an accident, those injured on a Princess ship could sue the cruise line in their home state, 
while Carnival's customers are required to travel to a courthouse in southern Florida. See Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
65. Korobkin, supra note 24, at 1206. For a discussion of Professor Korobkin's unconscionability 
analysis applied to form contracts more generally, see A lees, supra note 46, at 1539-4 7. Portions ofthat 
analysis are reproduced here. 
66. See id. at 1279. 
67. !d. at 1292. 
68. !d. 
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quality, non-salient terms.69 The imposition of these terms, Korobkin con-
cludes, promotes misinformation and inefficiencyJO From Korobkin's per-
spective, because both firms and their customers suffer from the 
inefficiency, a bilateral incentive to ensure nonenforcement of these ineffi-
cient non-salient terms existsJI 
Korobkin believes that a determination of unconscionability, and 
therefore inefficiency, should be left to courts asked to determine the en-
forceability of non-salient terms. 72 He notes, though, that "[j]udicial deter-
minations of which contract terms are efficient and which terms are 
inefficient are subject to a high likelihood of error."73 To overcome the 
probability of judicial error, Korobkin proposes that boilerplate terms carry 
a presumption of enforceability.74 Such a presumption would reduce the 
number of decisions that refuse to enforce (what tum out to be) efficient 
terms, findings Korobkin calls "false positives."75 However, Korobkin 
offers no reason to assume that erroneous findings of inefficiency (false 
positives) would occur with any more frequency than erroneous findings of 
efficiency (false negatives). It would seem that if courts are not particularly 
good at making efficiency determinations, they are no more likely to get 
the math right in one direction than the other. 
To appreciate the impact of Korobkin's reliance on the unconscion-
ability doctrine, consider how his analysis would operate to determine the 
efficiency of a term (a checking account overdraft protection charge, say) 
worth $15 to bank customers that it costs the bank $10 to provide. Under 
Korobkin's unconscionability-as-inefficiency formula, the term is efficient 
and should be enforced. But to posit the value of overdraft protection as 
$15 for every customer is a somewhat arbitrary assumption. It is much 
more likely that each customer will value the term differently,76 with cus-
tomers who routinely bounce checks willing to pay more for the term than 
69. Korobkin is concerned only with inefficient non-salient terms because he believes the market 
will effectively police inefficient terms that are salient. /d. at 1207. Salient terms are less problematic in 
the bank-customer context because they are more often accompanied by competition and advertisement. 
See supra text accompanying note 4 7. 
70. Korobkin, supra note 24, at 1234--35. 
71. /d. 
72. /d. at 1279 ("[T]he courts' approach to substantive unconscionability analysis is not well-
suited to separating terms that are detrimental to buyers as a class from those beneficial to buyers as a 
class."). 
73. /d. at 1285. 
74. /d. 
75. /d. 
76. The buyer's sophistication might well determine the efficiency of a particular term. For exam-
ple, the lawyer who enrolls in a checking account that contains an arbitration clause might be less 
troubled by the impact of that clause on her ability to obtain legal representation in an arbitration pro-
ceeding than would a non-lawyer without the same ability to represent herself. 
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customers who never bounce checks. Korobkin determines the efficiency 
of a term by reference to the term's average value to an average cus-
tomer. 77 When we understand that terms are worth more to some customers 
than others-and therefore efficient to some, but not others-the failure of 
his thesis becomes clear. 
Korobkin's efficiency-in-the-aggregate analysis fails on another front. 
If the value of a term that matters for efficiency purposes is not the value to 
the individual customer, there is no reason courts should be doing the value 
analysis on an ad hoc basis. Korobkin's presumption of enforceability ac-
knowledges that courts are not particularly adept at making efficiency de-
terminations in individual cases. Surely, then, courts cannot make across-
the-board determinations about the aggregate efficiency of terms generally. 
A small-claims court judge78 is just not in the best position to decide that 
forum selection clauses, say, will never be efficient. If aggregate efficiency 
is the goal, then the job of policing inefficient terms should be left to a 
regulatory agency. Undoubtedly, the Federal Reserve Board is in a better 
position than a trial court to decide the aggregate efficiency of a particular 
term contained in a bank-customer agreement. 
Now that the shrouding function of guerilla terms is manifest, the fail-
ure of Korobkin's aggregate efficiency analysis is readily identifiable. Re-
call, firms exploit myopic customers, while sophisticated customers benefit 
from, and perhaps encourage, that exploitation. The myopic are left to fend 
for themselves by filing an action in a common law court and persuading 
the judge that the term to which they fell victim is inefficient in the aggre-
gate, therefore unconscionable, and should not be enforced. But keep in 
mind, it would have been irrational for the myopic to have read the form in 
the first place 79 and neither the firm nor its sophisticated customers had any 
reason to alert them to the term and every reason to hide it from them. For 
this reason, scholars writing after Gabaix and Laibson look to the effects 
sophisticated customers may have on guerilla terms. Perhaps the sophisti-
cated can act as a barrier between the myopic and the terms that would 
exploit them. 
77. Such a determination may be impossible. See generally Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 840-42 (2003) (arguing 
that "there is no way to measure the variables that determine the relative efficiency" of a rule of con-
tract interpretation). 
78. Given the small amounts of money involved in most bank-customer disputes, small claims 
court is the most likely forum. 
79. See supra notes 24, 61. 
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B. Agency Theory 
Professor Douglas Baird offered a solution to "the boilerplate puzzle" 
in his contribution to a recent Michigan Law Review Symposium issue. 80 
Baird argues that "[a ]s long as there are enough sophisticated buyers aware 
ofthe importance of having the right [product], the seller must choose well. 
The sophisticated buyer provides protection for those that are entirely igno-
rant."8I Well, as we have seen, that is in fact not true. Baird's analysis ig-
nores the effect of shrouding on form contracts and so undermines his 
conclusion about the dynamics of form contracting. Further, he states cate-
gorically that "fine print is an exceedingly poor candidate for would-be 
advantage-takers."82 That ignores the reality of business-to-consumer form 
contracting, and so offers no explanation for the proliferation of shrouded 
terms.83 
It could be, though, that Baird's conclusions are misleading because 
he generalizes too much about the operation of fine print boilerplate. He 
considers the case in which a seller markets a deficient product and in-
cludes terms in the sales agreement that prejudice the buyer's interests. 
Baird observes that "it is easier to shave costs by using low-quality materi-
als than by using fine print. "84 That may be true; we are not sure that we 
can know for certain as an actuarial matter. But the fact remains that in 
many consumer contracts, particularly contracts that exact fees that the 
bank can collect relatively effortlessly (e.g., by debiting the customer's 
account) the terms are the product.85 If we apply Baird's analysis to bank-
customer agreements, perhaps even he would support more robust regula-
tion: "At the very least, one should pay attention to whether the market is 
one in which sellers can discriminate between those buyers who are sophis-
ticated and those who are not. "86 Of course, banks can and do discriminate 
between their sophisticated and their less-sophisticated customers. Indeed 
80. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006). 
81. /d. at 936. For a similar pre-shrouding agency theory, see Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Con-
tracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679. Gillette's conclusions are discussed in Alces, 
supra note 46, at 1533-39. 
82. Baird, supra note 80, at 937. 
83. A term may be every bit as shrouded on account of its non-salience (in the Korobkin sense) as 
it would be were it in barely legible fine print. Font size just is not determinative of anything in a con-
tracting world where terms can be very effectively hidden in plain sight. 
84. Baird, supra note 80, at 938. 
85. See Radin, supra note 24, at 1229 (noting the modem "collapse of the contract-product dis-
tinction"). 
86. Baird, supra note 80, at 939. Baird mentions "payday lending," where borrowers "are not 
likely to include any sophisticated parties," as an example of such an industry. /d. at 939 & n.20. In 
such a setting, he argues, regulation would be appropriate. /d. 
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banks, insofar as they are in possession of a large percentage of a cus-
tomer's liquid assets (likely a good measure of "sophistication"), are per-
haps in a better position than any other business to determine which of their 
customers are sophisticated and which are not. 87 The ability to discriminate 
in favor of the sophisticated will be manifest not just in reduced account 
fees, 88 but also in the increased willingness of banks to forego enforcement 
of a term that is particularly prejudicial to customer interests. 89 
Baird's conclusion rests on an economic argument that unravels when 
one takes into account the shrouding device. In a discussion of Henningsen 
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. ,90 he suggests that sophisticated car buyers 
would not bargain for the availability of consequential damages because 
the seller would have to increase the cost of the car to compensate itself for 
assuming such liability.91 And that cost would be greater than the benefit to 
the buyer: "In a world in which juries resolve factual disputes, consumers 
may be better off accepting a disclaimer rather than paying the higher price 
that covers the cost of paying for accidents caused by the carelessness of 
others, but for which a jury will hold the carmaker liable."92 That is, con-
sumers would prefer to assume the lesser cost of such consequential loss 
themselves (through their own insurance) rather than have the seller as-
sume liability for such loss and pass the greater cost on to the consumer.93 
The consumer could be the cheaper cost a voider. 94 
Baird makes the point that consumers can buy insurance to compen-
sate themselves for consequential loss that results from a product's failure. 
87. Nearly all banks provide extra services, usually in the form of "preferred banking" accounts, 
to high net-worth individuals, likely the most sophisticated of bank customers. These accounts provide 
perks such as free travelers' checks, reduced interest rates on loans, and higher interest rates on money 
market accounts, COs, and IRAs. See, e.g., Community First Bank, Preferred Banking, 
http://www.community I st.com/preferred.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
88. See, e.g., Huntington National Bank, Total Relationship Banking, 
https://www.huntington.com/pas/total_relationship.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008) ("Your Total Rela-
tionship Balance can qualify you for waiver of certain fees on an applicable checking account ... . "); 
Chase Bank, Premier Platinum Banking, http://www.chase.com/ccp/index.jsp?pg_name=ccpmapp/ 
platinum/checking/page/checking (last visited Mar. 22, 2008) (customers with a $75,000 "combined 
monthly average balance" pay no service fees, no fees for overdraft protection transfers, and get a free 
small safe deposit box). 
89. See infra text accompanying note 106. 
90. 161 A.2d69(N.J.I960). 
91. Baird, supra note 80, at 940-42. 
92. /d. at 940-41. 
93. "Carmakers may disclaim liability for consequential damages because it represents a sensible 
trade-off between the risks that the carmaker is equipped to bear and those the consumer can bear." /d. 
at 940 (citing George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 
(1981)). 
94. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499,517-19 (1961). 
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And it is not difficult to appreciate that those who own two cars or live 
within a short walk of public transportation do just that, at least in some 
rough form. Of course, there is no reason why a consumer would necessar-
ily want to pay a premium for a product to buy consequential loss coverage 
at a price determined by reference to the average consequential loss suf-
fered by the average consumer. But personal injury is a form of consequen-
tial loss against which consumers quite often insure. If your car 
malfunctions and you are injured in the resulting accident, both your auto-
mobile and your general health insurance policy will likely cover virtually 
all of your medical expenses. So if insurance is the answer, it does not too 
obviously matter, so far as economic analysis is concerned, whether the 
question is property or personal injury loss. The availability of insurance 
overcomes any suggestion that it is necessarily in the best interest of con-
sumers to provide them a non-disclaimable right to consequential damages 
for personal injury as a matter of law. Baird's reliance on the availability of 
insurance to limit the reach of Henningsen goes too far. 
Henningsen, ultimately, is about the power of agreement, and the 
normative imperative of agreement in contract law. The court's conclusion 
was cast in terms of immanent justice.95 Baird's analysis of the case does 
nothing to support his incorrect empirical judgment that "[t]he sophisti-
cated buyer provides protection for those that are entirely ignorant."96 He 
has repeated as a truism something that is just not true. So long as the so-
phisticated are not agents, in any meaningful sense, of myopic principals, 
there is no basis to find agreement in the type of standardized form used in 
Henningsen. 
Baird next turns to the treatment of exemption waivers, such as that in 
the (in)famous Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.97 case. He con-
cludes that Williams came out the way it did-invalidating the cross-
collateralization provision of the consumer contract-because the court 
wanted to police what amounted to an exemption waiver.98 The debtor 
simply did not understand what she had agreed to, which is, of course, an-
95 . 161 A.2d at 80, 83-85, 93, 99-101; see Peter A. A Ices, On Discovering Doctrine: "Justice" in 
Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 471,492-95 (2005). 
96. Baird, supra note 80, at 936. 
97. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
98. Baird, supra note 80, at 951 . The purpose of the creative payment allocation terms employed 
by Walker-Thomas was to "keep a balance due on every item purchased until the balance due on all 
items, whenever purchased, was liquidated," Williams, 350 F.2d at 447, thereby preserving the consen-
sual collateral interest in each item and effectively acquiring a waiver by Williams of her exemptions. 
Terms such as these are now prohibited by law. See Unfair Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(2) 
(2007) (exemption waivers are unenforceable "unless the waiver applies solely to property subject to a 
security interest executed in connection with the obligation."). 
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other way of saying there was no "agreement." Here, though, Baird tries to 
scale a slippery slope. 
If Williams did not understand well enough what she was agreeing to 
in order for the law to enforce her undertaking-if there was no agree-
ment-then we must acknowledge that some consumers may assume obli-
gations that they do not understand. It is not enough in Ms. Williams's case 
to say that we would enforce the term because the existence of sophisti-
cated consumers operates to protect the Ms. Williamses of the world. The 
fact that the objectionable clause found its way into the agreement should 
be proof enough that Baird's agency argument is fallacious: where were the 
sophisticated consumers who · would impose the pressure to keep it out? 
Nonetheless, the case is quite helpful because it demonstrates the wisdom 
of Gabaix and Laibson's shrouding conclusion: sophisticated buyers would 
agree to the cross-collateralization provision and then avoid its enforce-
ment; alternatively, sophisticated consumers would know enough not to 
agree to such a clause and would buy from a seller who would not insist 
upon it. And sellers could afford to sell to such sophisticated buyers at a 
lower price because the myopic consumers, like Ms. Williams, would be 
subsidizing their purchase. 
But Baird, perhaps unwittingly, gets the agreement calculus right in 
the context of the Williams case and with regard to exemption waivers gen-
erally: agreement, real agreement, matters. And the law does not mind at 
least a little bit of paternalism to make sure that agreement matters: 
Her willingness to give up the furniture in the event of default sends a 
powerful signal that default is unlikely. But we cannot be sure that she 
will in fact be well-informed and, if we cannot be sure, the game may not 
be worth the candle. We might prefer weak paternalism, but when that 
avenue is not available, strong paternalism is a sensible course.99 
Baird acknowledges that for us to be able to infer anything about what 
someone in Ms. Williams's position is trying to signal about the likelihood 
of her own default, she first has to know what she is giving up if she con-
tractually gives up some right. That is, the term to which a contracting 
party is willing to agree may well signal something valuable to the coun-
terparty. But a waiver signals nothing reliably if the waiver is not effected 
knowingly: "Devising a rule that brings about a fully informed waiver on 
99. Baird, supra note 80, at 945. A distinction between weak and strong paternalism is found in 
Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2006). "[S]trong paternalism 
forecloses choice, typically on the ground that all or most people will choose unwisely," id. at 254, 
while weak paternalism "steer[s] people in welfare-promoting directions" while still permitting individ-
ual decision-making, at least to some degree. !d. at 256. Sunstein describes bans on the use of cocaine 
as strongly paternalistic, and automatic savings plans as weakly paternalistic. !d. at 254-56. 
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the floor of an inner-city furniture store is just not possible. For this reason, 
it may make sense to ban such clauses altogether."IOO 
We do not have to go much further to show that Baird's conclusion 
about absolutely banning certain clauses undermines his argument about 
sophisticated transactors being agents for the unsophisticated. If whenever 
the circumstances are such as to cast doubt on a contracting party's under-
standing, even awareness, of the terms of a form agreement we have reason 
to "ban such clauses altogether," then we have good reason to ban the en-
forcement of such terms generally, because the whole point offorms is that 
it is irrational to read them. That is, if there is one thing we know about 
forms, it is that they are not read. Further, we can also be quite confident 
that, even if they are read, the consequences of even their most pernicious 
terms will not be understood. Baird concludes that even many contracts 
professors who have taught Williams for many years fail to understand that 
the case is essentially about the waiver of the exemptions, and he sees rea-
son to refuse to enforce the cross-collateralization provision at issue in the 
case.I Ot Is it likely true that most of the more oppressive terms in consumer 
form contracts are not understood by the consumers who ostensibly agree 
to them? Indeed, how many attorneys would know, without doing some 
research, whether a particular term is enforceable and what it would mean 
to enforce it? So ultimately Baird is after contract in terms of agreement. 
He just takes a more circuitous route.t 02 
But might there remain a way to argue for the enforcement of guerilla 
terms because they favor the sophisticated? That is, can we find in the en-
forcement (or lack thereof) of oppressive terms a reason for the law to be 
indulgent of them? At least one commentator has tried to make the case. 
I 00. Baird, supra note 80, at 945. In a more complete discussion of signaling in the context of the 
Carbolic Smoke Ball case, Baird concludes that fine print may actually impair the seller's ability to 
signal: "Blocking the operation of fine print makes it cheaper for sellers to distinguish themselves." /d. 
at 949-50. If so, it would seem that even sellers should support a rule invalidating boilerplate, if, as an 
empirical matter, they gain more by being able to signal than they lose in not being able to tailor their 
deal to specific customers or customer groups. 
I 0 I. "A clause buried in a purchase agreement whose legal consequences are not self-evident (even 
to many contracts professors who have taught the case for many years) ... should not be enforced." !d. 
at 945. 
102. Baird concludes that some standard terms-forum selection, choice-of-law, and arbitration 
provisions, for example-are "special" and so should be "disclosed conspicuously or meet minimum 
standards." !d. at 950. But if terms are not truly conspicuous, surely it is wrong to assume agreement 
and enforce them. The "minimum standard" Baird seems to be after is agreement. 
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C. "The Squeaky Wheel Gets the Grease" 
Professor Jason Johnston offers a sophisticated "defense" of boiler-
plate103 based on the ability of sophisticated parties to bargain around boi-
lerplate: "[R]ather than precluding bargaining and negotiation, standard-
form contracts in fact facilitate bargaining and are a crucial instrument in 
the establishment and maintenance of cooperative relationships between 
firms and their customers."l04 After first offering empirical evidence that 
firms routinely permit their agents to relax the enforcement of potentially 
oppressive terms, I 05 Johnston suggests that firms offer discretionary bene-
fits and discretionary forgiveness to their customers who call to complain 
or ask for a favor, something like a "squeaky wheel gets the grease" theory 
of boilerplate non-enforcement: 
The strategy of allowing employees the discretion to grant case-specific 
benefits beyond those that are required by the standard-form contract can 
be seen to be a sophisticated way for the firm to grow its revenues by 
gaining the loyalty of existing customers and establishing a good reputa-
tion that will attract new customers.106 
The fallacy, or at least economic error, of Johnston's thesis is starkly 
captured in his conclusion that "the most important type of customer to 
keep happy is the customer who is relatively knowledgeable, persuasive, 
and strategic- a sharp bargainer."107 That is, Johnston theorizes that firms 
want to attract and retain precisely those customers whom Gabaix and 
Laibson's theory tells us they would want to repel: the sophisticated. But 
while Gabaix and Laibson offer formulaic support for their conclusion, 
Johnston offers none and does not evidence any appreciation ofthe shroud-
ing phenomenon. Instead he opines that it is by complaining that the most 
desirable customers identify themselves, and he describes those complain-
ing customers as the "high-value, high-information consumers"l08 that 
103. Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form 
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Business and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REv. 857 (2006). 
104. /d. at 858. 
105. Johnston concludes that "[t]he common practice among firms is to give their employees the 
discretion to depart from these standard-form terms and to deliver more than the firm has actually 
promised if deemed in the firm's best interest to do so." /d. at 865. 
106. !d. at 877. 
107. /d. at 881. Professor Bebchuk and Judge Posner contradict this assertion directly. See Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. 
L. REv. 827 (2006). Bebchuk and Posner argue that reputational concerns drive firms to rigidly enforce 
potentially oppressive form terms against strategic bargainers, while relaxing (or foregoing entirely) 
enforcement against customers who trigger the operation of those terms "in good faith and for good 
reason." /d. at 834. 
I 08. Johnston, supra note I 03, at 881. 
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firms want to attract and maintain. So he contradicts Gabaix and Laibson 
just about as directly as he can. Indeed, if we follow Johnston's logic, firms 
want to avoid the same myopic customers whom the shrouding theory iden-
tifies as most profitable.! 09 
Johnston does somewhat cryptically allude to Gabaix and Laibson 's 
shrouding thesis, but he does not seem to appreciate its impact on his dis-
crimination theory. After observing that "[u]nless there are barriers to en-
try, or consumers have very high switching costs, the discretionary-benefits 
strategy will be undermined by the entry of no-frills, low-price provid-
ers,"IIO he offers a brief footnote to accompany that text. III In that foot-
note, Johnston cites Gabaix and Laibson only in order to dismiss, 
cryptically and in conclusory terms, the application of shrouding to his 
discovery: "Discretionary benefits are in this important sense quite differ-
ent than the case of shrouded costs considered by Gabaix and Laibson." 112 
Johnston's conclusion, then, is that the "two-part standard-form contracting 
practice should exhibit long-term survival only in industries that are rela-
tively non-competitive."ll3 That would seem to be an admission that, in 
competitive industries, shrouding overwhelms his theory .114 So what would 
explain the vibrancy of oppressive boilerplate in competitive industries? 
Shrouding, we think. And recall, shrouding is inefficient at equilibrium. 
Johnston also seems to ignore aspects of the cross-subsidization 
Gabaix and Laibson identified in the course of their shrouding exposition. 
Recall that it is the presence of myopic consumers that enables sophisti-
cated consumers to get the favorable deal that shrouding provides. Johnston 
refers to the myopic consumers as "low-value, low-sophistication consum-
ers."115 
[W]hereas under the discretionary strategy high-value customers were 
met with an ex-post willingness to bargain, they will often encounter pre-
I 09. Johnston acknowledges that "the complaint-based benefits strategy not only allows the firm to 
retain and add sophisticated, influential customers, but effectively gives those customers a price subsidy 
that is paid for by less-well-informed, or simply more acquiescent, consumers." /d. at 882. Those " less-
well-informed, or simply more acquiescent, consumers" are the myopes of Gabaix and Laibson's 
shrouding theory. It is curious that Johnston describes the sophisticated customers as those the finns 
would want to retain when it is clear, even from his own analysis, that firms make more money on the 
myopes. 
II 0. /d. at 883. 
Ill. /d. at 883 n.l 02. While we have no way of knowing whether this might be the case, Johnston's 
footnote reads like an afterthought, as though he discovered Gabaix and Laibson too late to take account 
of their conclusions. 
112. /d. 
113. /d.at884. 
114. We have trouble thinking of a non-competitive industry in which the enforceability of boiler-
plate is problematic. 
115. !d. at 885. 
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cisely the opposite, unreasonable insistence upon narrow interpretations 
of standard-form obligations, in the world of mandatory standard-form 
terms. This makes it much more likely that the high-value, high-
sophistication types will drop out of the market for the firm's product or 
service and switch their business to a more expensive higher-quality pro-
vider, a provider whose prices are so high that low-value, low-
sophistication customers are not part of the market. In such a case, man-
dating generous standard-form terms may induce a kind of adverse selec-
tion; as higher-value customers drop out, and the ostensibly generous 
standard-form terms offered to remaining low-value, low-sophistication 
customers are in practice degraded further and further.lt6 
Now think about that for a minute. First, it is just not clear how the 
sophisticated would be worse off if the law mandated that they be given 
what they otherwise would have to spend time negotiating for. More im-
portantly, Johnston's supposition flies in the face of the cross-subsidization 
theory that explains shrouding: the very reason that the sophisticated are 
able to get what they get in a shrouded regime is because they are subsi-
dized by the myopic, the "low-value, low-sophistication customers." The 
inefficiency only works in the contract drafters' and sophisticated custom-
ers' favor as it does because there is a large enough pool of myopes.tt 7 
There is a wealth transfer from the myopic to the sophisticated. It is not 
clear that Johnston appreciates the attendant socioeconomics. 
Johnston indulges supposition further when he tries to imagine the cir-
cumstances of the customer most likely to benefit from the discretionary 
forgiveness strategy: 
It might well be that it is the middle-income customer who is most famil-
iar with and adept at bargaining with the firm when something goes 
wrong with her or the firm's performance . ... If this is so, then the tough 
standard form combined with discretionary forgiveness strategy may be 
one which especially benefits customers who are keen but not 
wealthy .... [I]t will be such smart but middle-income customers who 
will be most harmed by a legal rule mandating generous standard-form 
terms.t18 
Such imagination is sufficiently divorced from any empirical basis-
including any measure of the socioeconomic status of those who complain 
in various contextsti9_as to be useless as argument. It might also be the 
case that the very terms the enforcement of which causes customers to call 
116. !d. at 885-86. 
117. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 49, at 510. 
118. Johnston, supra note I 03, at 886. 
119. Johnston's survey of hospital billing procedures, for example, finds that "most hospital cus-
tomers negotiate discounts off charges," id. at 865, but we are left to wonder whether the customers 
who did in fact negotiate were those who could not pay the full amount (myopes?) or those who simply 
did not wish to pay the full amount (sophisticated?). 
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and complain are the same terms that the wealthy (including the relatively 
wealthy in the middle class) just do not have occasion to care about as of-
ten as do the myopes who might be more regularly affected.12o And, of 
course, if you understand shrouding, you understand that it is precisely the 
terms that adversely and disproportionately affect the myopes that are most 
likely to be imposed on them. To the extent that we can trust intuition, it 
would seem that the more likely valid intuition would be that the less 
wealthy you are, the less sophisticated you are, and in tum, the more vul-
nerable you are to terms that could negatively impact one of more marginal 
economic status. The point is not that one intuition is necessarily more right 
than the other; the point is that there is no empirical basis to conclude that 
either is accurate. And it matters: if Johnston's intuition is wrong, his ar-
gument fails. 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the varied attempts to craft 
a trust-the-market solution to the shrouding effect of guerilla terms fail 
because they lack an appreciation of the cross-subsidy that accounts for that 
shrouding. If the market cannot alleviate the pernicious effects of these 
terms, what can? A return to contract doctrine, where agreement means 
real, bona fide agreement, may just provide the means, at least in the con-
text of bank customer agreements. 
IV. THE POWER OF AGREEMENT 
Contract, as distinguished from tort, is about consensual obligations. 
Contract doctrine requires "bargain" and "agreement" between the parties 
before a promise acquires legal enforceability. But the pace of modem 
contractual contexts just does not permit reflected inquiry into the "real" 
intent of the parties. It has become commonplace, and perhaps unavoidable, 
to demand less than real agreement and instead to settle for terms to which 
the parties would have, could have, or should have agreed if they had 
thought about it. When transactors have acted as though they have agreed, 
courts are comfortable assuming sufficient agreement and enforcing the 
contract. But real agreement and inferred agreement are not one and the 
same, and we cannot "trust the market" to deliver the term that is best for 
all concerned. So whether you believe that contract should vindicate auton-
omy or efficiency, the reality is that in modem bank-customer transactional 
settings it vindicates neither. 
120. It would seem that myopes would be affected in greater numbers by, for example, provisions 
governing double cycle billing and penalty increases in interest rates. See supra note 19. 
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If there is no real agreement between banks and their customers about 
account terms, and the market fails to weed out those terms that have per-
nicious effects on consumers-whether myopic, sophisticated, or both121_ 
then we must find some other mechanism to police these agreements. Arti-
cle 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code was an attempt to create just such a 
mechanism: a laundry list of acceptable terms that would regulate the bank-
customer relationship and prevent banks from gaining too much power 
over their customers. But like all paternalistic legislation, 122 the terms of 
Article 4 would be disadvantageous to some banks and their customers. 
The escape clause of section 4-1 03 provided the means to circumvent those 
effects. When the escape clause becomes the rule rather than the exception, 
however, a reexamination is due. 
At the time of Article 4's enactment, no viable means existed of edu-
cating bank customers about the effects of the form terms contained in their 
agreements. Recall, the pernicious effects of guerilla terms in bank agree-
ments derive from their shrouded nature, and so can be undone if exposed 
to light.I23 Technological advances, particularly the Internet, that now have 
become commonplace can provide that light. That is, the very modem 
transactional realities that spawned the guerilla term may provide a means 
to mitigate its effects. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing bank customers is a lack of in-
formation. How many people know how much their bank will charge them 
for using another bank's ATM or for stopping payment on an outstanding 
check, for example? One readily available solution to customers' ignorance 
is an online clearinghouse in which banks are required by law to reproduce 
the terms of their agreements.124 Such a clearinghouse would be a small 
121. If banks collude so that they may provide terms especially beneficial to themselves without 
worrying about competition from others, they disadvantage all customers, irrespective of status. See 
supra note 36. 
122. For a discussion of the paternalism underlying the Williams case, see supra note 99 and ac-
companying text. 
123. Here, Justice Brandeis's famous observation that sunlight is the most powerful disinfectant is 
apt. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 305 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing 
FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (1949)). 
124. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 provides legislative precedent for such 
an idea. Under that law, credit reporting companies are required to make yearly credit reports available 
to consumers at no charge. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. IV 2004). 
At the 2005 AALS mid-year meeting, Professor William Whitford argued that the complexi-
ties inherent in effectively policing oppressive form terms make that task best suited to a legislative 
body. The outline Professor Whitman prepared for .the talk is available at http:/lwww.aals.org/ 
2005midyear/commerciai!Whitford0utline.pdf. Rather than opting for direct regulation of the content 
of form terms, we are making the somewhat more modest point that regulation can be used to bring the 
effect and operation of these terms to the attention of customers, thereby making the non-salient salient 
and reducing the potentially pernicious effects of otherwise hidden form terms. 
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addition to the responsibilities ofthe Federal Reserve Board, which already 
exercises extensive supervisory and regulatory authority over deposit 
banks.t25 Once all bank terms were collected, charts allowing customers to 
compare the terms offered by their banks with the terms offered by others 
could be created easily.t26 By visiting a single web source, 127 bank cus-
tomers could educate themselves (almost) costlessly. The Federal Reserve 
already maintains such a database for banks' financial information. t28 With 
a database providing information that explained the effects of the terms of 
bank-customer agreements, people who use banks-and not just those who 
invest in them-would better understand the nature of the transactions (and 
accounts) they enter into. Providing accessible, comprehensible informa-
tion to bank customers would place the risk of guerilla terms in bank-
customer agreements on those in the best position to avoid their pernicious 
effects: the individual customers. With such an educational forum, guerilla 
terms could not so easily hide in the "jungle" of contract doctrine. 
The benefits of disclosure are twofold. Most obviously, bank custom-
ers who educate themselves about the effect and operation of the terms in 
their account agreements would shed their myopic status, thereby minimiz-
ing the cross-subsidy perpetuated by guerilla terms. Of course, self-
education is not the absolute solution: the limitations of disclosure have 
been well documented, 129 and not all bank customers will take the time to 
educate themselves. The benefits of education, though, are not limited to a 
125. Indeed, part of the Federal Reserve's mission is the education ofbank customers. In the Fed-
eral Reserve's words, "Well-educated consumers are the best consumer protection in the market. They 
know their rights and responsibilities, and they use the information provided in disclosures to shop and 
compare." BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 76 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_6.pdf. This 
proposed next step, which amounts to little more than additional disclosures, provides consumers more 
information with which to protect themselves. 
126. The Federal Reserve Board has undertaken similar public education programs aimed at help-
ing consumers understand mortgages, electronic transfers, and credit protection laws. See Federal 
Reserve Board, Consumer Information Brochures, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/brochure.htm 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
127. Undoubtedly, third-party sites would take the information contained in the Federal Reserve 
repository and synthesize it (perhaps for a charge), thereby further facilitating bank customer education. 
128. The database, known as the National Information Center, contains financial data and institu-
tional characteristics collected by the Federal Reserve System. See The National Information Center, 
Home Page, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/nichome.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). The 
FDIC maintains a similar database. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statistics on Depository 
Institutions, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
129. For a general discussion of the potential difficulties in educating customers via disclosures and 
warning labels, see Jennifer J. Argo & Kelley J. Main, Meta-Analyses of the Effectiveness of Warning 
Labels, 23 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 193 (2004). The Internet may itself pose some distinct prob-
lems for the effectiveness of disclosures. See Jean Braucher, Rent-Seeking and Risk-Fixing in the New 
Statutory Law of Electronic Commerce: Difficulties in Moving Consumer Protection Online, 200 I WIS. 
L. REv. 527. Nevertheless, while dissemination of information to bank customers is not the entire 
solution, it retains some utility in combating the problems inherent in a shrouding regime. 
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reduction in the number of myopic bank customers. Once it is obvious to 
many customers-those who took the time to educate themselves-how the 
terms of their agreements work, competition and advertisement will ensue 
among banks seeking to attract these customers. Because competition and 
advertisement transform a guerilla term into a salient term, 130 education has 
the effect of reducing both the number of myopic customers as well as the 
number of guerilla terms that would disadvantage the myopes that remain. 
We do not mean to suggest that the Federal Reserve Board should po-
lice inefficient bank terms. What is efficient for one bank customer may not 
be efficient for another. Indeed, conceptions of "aggregate efficiency," 
such as that offered by Korobkin, miss the point: they do not reflect the 
rational, informed choice of the contracting parties. Aggregate efficiency 
does no better than terms unilaterally added to bank-customer agreements: 
both ignore the conceptions of individual autonomy at the foundation of 
contract law. And there is no reason that contract must settle for efficiency 
in the aggregate when it can do better. 
A method by which bank customers can educate themselves permits a 
return to contract doctrine in which "agreement" means real understanding. 
Contract would once again vindicate the consent of the transactors. Now, 
taking agreement seriously does not require unyielding deference to cus-
tomers' assertions that they did not in fact understand and agree to the 
terms of their agreement. Quite the opposite: when a customer has avail-
able all the necessary information with which to make an informed decision 
about which bank and which account to choose, it may be entirely appro-
priate to determine that the customer did agree even if, after the fact, she 
protests that she did not. This determination is one that courts have made 
for centuries, and they once again should be given the means to make the 
determination accurately. 
CONCLUSION 
Shrouding is what banks do-what they always have done-when 
there is more money to be made by maintaining a pool of customers in 
which the myopic subsidize the sophisticated. Banks are better off not ad-
vertising, not increasing the pool of sophisticated. But "shrouding" also 
results in welfare losses: hidden and oppressive terms result in some cus-
tomers being victimized by bank accounts that they should not have 
opened. 
130. See supra text accompanying note 4 7. 
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The deficiency of the current trust-the-market solutions is that they 
fail to take seriously contract doctrine in terms of "bargain" and "agree-
ment," relying instead on inferred assent and constructive agreement. The 
prevailing incentive structure established by shrouding has, of course, been 
in place as long as transactors of unequal bargaining power have entered 
into contracts and sellers have been able to exploit informational asymme-
tries. At equilibrium, there is no incentive to educate the myopic. 
We have proposed to supply that incentive. When bank customers 
have in hand the means to alleviate the effects of informational cross-
subsidies, the attendant welfare losses will be minimized. The only myopes 
that remain will be the willfully myopic, a group to whom contract histori-
cally has offered little assistance. Once the shroud is lifted, bank-customer 
agreements, like any other contract, can be evaluated by reference to classi-
cal notions of bargain and agreement. 
